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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to examine whether the levels of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks are value-
relevant or not. The sample of this investigation consists of all banks listed on the Saudi Stock Market 
Exchange (Tadawul). All data was collected from the annual reports of the sample banks from 2009 to 
2013 using manual content analysis. Other variables were collected using DataStream and Bloomberg.  
Ordinary least squares regressions analysis was used. The findings of the multivariate analysis 
demonstrated that there is no association between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm value as 
measured by the market to book value at the end of the year (MTBV). But, the results generate from the 
accounting based measure (ROA) show that there is a positively significant association between the levels 
of voluntary risk disclosure and firm value. This study contributes to the literature on general accounting 
disclosure and in particular advances and contributes to the literature on risk disclosure in developing 
economies. It also contributes to the understanding of the role of accounting information in relation to the 
market valuation of a firm. The empirical findings of this study have several implications for banks’ 
investors, regulatory bodies and any other interested group as they report the importance of corporate risk 
disclosure and its economic consequences. This can be used to increase the value relevance in the banking 
sector. This study also informs regulators about the current level of risk disclosure in all Saudi listed 
banks.To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no prior research has been conducted on the relationship 
between firm value and levels of risk disclosure in general nor especially in emerging markets, such as 
Saudi Arabia, the focus of this study.  
 
JEL: M4, M49 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
he need for financial reporting and disclosure raises from increased information asymmetry gaps 
and agency conflicts between insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors) (Kothari et al., 2009). 
However, corporate disclosures can assists in reducing such information gaps, ease such conflicts 
augment the credibility of such financial reportage, and complement the role of accounting information in 
relation to firm value. Previous researches have studies the consequences of disclosure on market valuation 
of firm (Klein et al., 2005). Enhanced accessibility of corporate information can enhance the capital market 
efficiency and entice more investors (Wang et al., 2008). Hassan et al., (2009) reported that disclosure is 
employed as an instrument to moderate agency costs ascending from the likelihood that insiders might not 
act in the best interest of investors. It has also been argued by Pagano et al., (2002) that disclosure is an 
instrument which permits stakeholders to enlarge their ability in monitoring and improving the valuation 
of the firm. 
T 
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The literature on the economic consequences of disclosure has mostly explored well-developed economies 
and focused on non-risk voluntary disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Clarkson et al., 1996; Baek et al., 
2004; Nekhili et al., 2012; 2015). In addition, Hassan et al. (2009) claimed that all the empirical findings 
on disclosure are in line with finance-theory extrapolations, implying that greater public disclosure of 
information to investors and interested groups increases the valuation of the firm.  Prior investigations have 
explored the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital and stock liquidity (Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), and a small 
stream of literature has examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm value (Hassan et 
al., 2009; Nekhili et al., 2012, 2015; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). However, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, all prior research on the latter relationship has been conducted on developed economies, whilst 
there is no empirical research focusing on this association in developing economies. Thus, the objective of 
this study is to examine the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm value in a 
developing economy, Saudi Arabia. Preceding literature has examined disclosure levels of firms and 
determinants of disclosure; whereas, there is not a large body of                               
research which examine the effect of disclosure on FV (Uyar and Kilic, 2012) yet the dearth is even greater 
when it comes to the effect of voluntary risk disclosure on firm value. Thus, there is a need for more 
elaboration on the value that corporate information have on risk disclosure in banks. 
 
This study is motivated by the fact that the effect of disclosure on firm value is still an empirical issue 
(Hassan et al., 2009). Further to this Al-Akra et al., (2010), has demounted that there is little empirical 
research to back the link between the two variables. Moreover, Hassan et al., (2009 p.80) has briefly touched 
upon this association by asserting that, “There is little direct empirical evidence with regard to the 
relationship between disclosure and firm value”. Hence, this research is motivated to conduct an empirical 
study in Saudi listed banks to demonstrate what the level of voluntary risk disclosure can add value for the 
sample banks. It is also motivated by the rarity of studies exploring the impact of the level of risk disclosure 
in relation to firm value. In addition, Vogel (2005) argued that the findings associated with the relationship 
between disclosure and firm value still remain inconclusive. Such inconclusiveness creates ground for 
further investigation not just for risk disclosure, but also for other kinds of disclosure. Furthermore, prior 
researches have claimed that the association between firm value and disclosure is sensitive to the proxy 
used for valuation of the firm (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Elzahar, 2013). The above argument also highlights 
the need for more research into this association. There is a dearth of academic examination that studies the 
potential economic consequences and valuation implications for banks. Finally, this study is motivated by 
the dearth of research on financial institutions reporting disclosures, risk disclosure and by the calls for 
more research on the valuation implications of such disclosures made by preceding studies (Hassan et al., 
2009; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
 
This study makes some contributions to the literature of risk disclosure and economic consequences. Even 
though, there have been a dearth of empirical studies studying the link between risk disclosure and market 
valuation in the banking sector, as far as the researcher knows, this is the first study to empirically 
investigate this relationship in Saudi banks. The study offers a unique contribution to the existing literature 
by looking at the economic consequences of risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. This study also 
contributes to the literature on general accounting disclosure and in particular advances the literature on 
risk disclosure in developing economies by empirically examining the link between voluntary risk 
disclosure levels and the market valuation of banks in Saudi Arabia. It also contributes to the literature by 
extending the traditional research on corporate disclosure beyond the narrow focus of financial disclosure 
to include risk disclosure in relation to firm value. This study also contributes to the existing literature by 
indicating that there is a positive firm value arising from the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. It also 
contributes to the understanding of the role of accounting information in relation to the market valuation of 
a firm. Studies about such markets are required and are fundamental to ameliorating the weak transparency 
and disclosure situation through attracting the attention of regulatory institutions and corporation directors 
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(Uyar and Kilic, 2012). There is a lack of research investigating the impacts of risk disclosure on the firm 
value for banks in a developing country. Thus this study fills this gap.  
 
It has been suggested by previous literature that there is a positive link between the levels of disclosure in 
relation to firm value. However, this association continues to be vague whether rises in information can 
assurance an enhanced market valuation of the firm for MTBV and ROA or not. Hence, the possible impact 
of risk disclosure on firm value is still an open empirical question particularly for banks in emerging markets. 
This study fills this gap in the literature by providing a direct analysis of the association between risk 
disclosure and firm value based on two different measures namely market to book value at the end of the 
year and profitability (MTBV and ROA). The first measure is a market based measure and the second is an 
accounting based measure.  This study focus is on banks in an emerging market context which offers a 
unique empirical setting which permits for a clearer and richer picture between their levels of voluntary risk 
disclosure and banks market valuation from well-developed countries. This investigation contributes to the 
literature by demonstrating that corporate risk disclosure is essential for efficient firm value. This proposes 
that policymakers, accounting and regulatory institutions such as SAMA, SOCOPA and the CMA might 
earnestly contemplate the quantity, quality and comprehensiveness of risk materials when endeavouring to 
facilitate capital market efficiency for Saudi listed bank by introducing a new form of risk disclosure’ 
measures. Prior economic consequences studies tend to concentrate on the cost of equity and remain silent 
in regards to the valuation of firms (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The findings of this investigation produce some 
awareness to help directors who attempt to increase the market value of their banks. The evidences of this 
investigation on the influence of risk disclosure in relation to firm value contribute to previous disclosure 
and risk disclosure literature by advancing the association between the two variables, which states that 
different proxies for firm value may have different effects on the level of risk disclosure.  
 
Preceding research has concentrated on other forms of economic consequences ignoring the market 
valuation of banks. The effects of augmented disclosure on cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; 
Kothari et al., 2009) analysts’ forecasts (Wang et al., 2013) financial performance (Wang et al., 2008) and 
share price anticipation of earnings (Schleicher et al., 2007). This stream of literature is focused mostly on 
developed countries. There is a dearth of research investigating the link between disclosure and firm value 
stated Uyar and Kilic (2012), especially in developing economies. This stream of research is still in its early 
stage. However, to the best of the researcher knowledge research concerning the association between risk 
disclosure and firm value is absent in general and in particular in banks in developing markets. However, 
the economic consequences have not yet been empirically examined in in banks in developing markets and 
in the case of this study in Saudi Arabia measuring the influence of risk disclosure on firm valuation.  
 
The empirical findings of this study indicate that the impact of the levels of voluntary risk disclosure on 
frim value vary depending on the proxy used for firm value. The results reported based on the market based 
measure show that there is a non-significant relationship between firm value and the levels of voluntary 
risk disclosure (MTBV). The results generate from the accounting based measure (ROA) show that there 
is a positively significant association between the levels of risk disclosure and firm value. The reminder of 
the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides the literature review and hypothesis development; section 
3 discusses the theoretical framework; section 4 outlines the research design; section 5 discusses the results; 
and section 6 concludes.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
Out of the many studies reported in the literature, only a few have explored firm value and disclosure in 
developed countries (Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Baek, Kang and Park, 2004; Da Silva 
and Alves, 2004; Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Elzahar et al., 2015) and only one study has examined firm value 
and disclosure in emerging economies (Hassan et al., 2009). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, not 
a single study has explored the effect of voluntary risk disclosure on firm value and thus this is the first to 
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do so. This dearth of literature makes this exploration of the relationship between firm value and voluntary 
risk disclosure in the context of Saudi Arabia all the more valuable. This study focuses particularly on the 
market valuation in relation to voluntary risk disclosure reported by all Saudi listed banks. It is worth noting 
that most of the preceding investigations into firm value have concentrated on disclosure in non-financial 
corporation (Baek et al., 2004; Hassan et al., 2009; Nekhili et al., 2012; 2015; Elzahar et al., 2015), leaving 
the association between the two variables in the banking industry completely un-researched. This study is 
intended to shed light on the effect of banks’ voluntary risk disclosure on firm value in an emerging market. 
Risk disclosure in the banking industry is still relatively under-researched and suffers from major 
limitations (Oliveira et al., 2011a; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013).  This is of particular importance for a 
number of reasons. Banks are risk management entities since their primary business it to take risks and 
provide liquidity. Accordingly, banks are predicted to release considerable amounts of risk disclosure in 
order to enlighten external investors (Bessis, 2002), thus indirectly increasing the market valuation of the 
firm. Generally, disclosure has ascended to a different level of significance within banks compared to non-
financial corporations since by their nature banks are inherently opaque (Huang, 2006).   
 
Prior literature on disclosure has indicated that corporate disclosure can moderate the information 
asymmetry amid internal and external personnel (Kothari et al., 2009). Therefore, improved disclosure may 
culminate in increased demand for a firm’s shares and, thus, a rise in the price of shares (Clarkson et al., 
1996; Hassan et al., 2009; Healy and Palepu, 1993) since the disclosure ought to reveal the firm’s value 
(Healy et al., 1999). An environment rich in information might result in positive economic consequences, 
such as increases in the value of the firm (Beyer et al., 2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The consequences 
of augmenting the levels of disclosure are usually debated in terms of diminishing mispricing, increasing 
profitability and firm value (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Moreover, prior empirical researches provide 
some supporting proof in relation to the association between voluntary disclosure levels and firm value. 
Healy et al., (1999) documented that companies with increased levels of disclosure could at the same time 
enjoy considerable improvements in market valuation. This direct effect of the levels of disclosure on firm 
value influences administrators’ decisions and effects the distribution of future cash flows (Lambert et al., 
2007). Also, according to Elzahar et al., (2015) augmented disclosure will possibly enhance the market 
valuation of firms.  
 
Substantial amounts of literature studied the effects of disclosure in generally, but the number of studies 
that investigated the impact of disclosure on firm value is limited. This lack is even greater when exploring 
risk disclosure in relation to firm value. Several empirical investigations established that voluntary 
disclosure augments stockholders’ ability to forecast future earnings, which has an effect of the valuation 
of the firm (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003). It has been contended by Rhodes and Soobaroyen (2010) that 
disclosure can limit the raise of agency conflicts by diminishing information asymmetry, consequentially 
augments market valuation of firms. Sheu et al., (2010) stipulated that the capital market only supplies 
higher firm valuations to firms, which opt for a more inclusive disclosure policy. Gordon et al., (2010) 
provided strong evidence that greater levels of voluntary disclosure are positively related with the valuation 
of the firm.  Nonetheless, the findings of researches investigating the relationship between corporate 
disclosure and firm value are mixed. For instance, several investigations have documented a positive link 
between the two variables (see Baek et al., 2004; Cheung et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2010; Jiao, 2011; 
Anam et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). However, Hassan et al., (2009) claimed that the effect of 
disclosure on firm value is still worthy of empirical investigation. They intimated that there is no significant 
association between firm value and discretionary disclosure although there is a negative and significant 
relationship between the market value of the firm and mandatory exposure. Concurring with their findings, 
Uyar and Kilic (2012) claimed that the link between discretionary disclosure and company value differs 
according to the proxy employed for the market value of the firm.   
 
In theory, the market value of a firm raises due to augmented disclosure levels via either a reduction in the 
cost of capital or an upturn in the cash flow to the company's shareholders or both (Amihud and Mendelson, 
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1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Debatably, high exposure levels decrease the cost of capital since 
they encourage investors to lower their estimation of the risk level and, thus, decrease the mandated rate of 
return when purchasing a company's shares (Coles et al., 1995; Clarkson et al., 1996). Moreover, the value 
of the company rises following the predicted enhancement in stock liquidity since the transaction costs are 
decreased whilst the demand for the company's shares soars (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). There could be problems with information asymmetry and agency conflicts between 
company directors and external stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001) since external investors do not 
generally have access to the in-house information of the firm that is freely available to company directors. 
This could affect the expectations of outside stakeholders concerning risk, mandated returns and company 
cost of capital and, thus, the company’s share value. However, augmented voluntary corporate disclosure 
can be employed to mitigate these problems (Hassan, 2009). 
 
Healy and Palepu (1993) argued that the higher the disclosure level, the more possibility there is that 
shareholders are able to understand the way managers operate. Also, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
claimed that by lowering the information asymmetry amongst management and un-informed shareholders 
leads to less uncertainty regarding the future performance of the company and an enhancement in the 
liquidity of its shares. Hence, Coles et al. (1995) and Clarkson et al. (1996) contended that lower transaction 
costs in addition to a higher demand for shares could lead to an upturn in share price and, thus, the value of 
the firm. Nonetheless, the impact of augmented disclosure may not be positive since it might have a negative 
impact on the company's competitiveness (Healy and Palepu, 1993) and, thus, have an adverse impact on 
the company's valuation. High quality exposure has a positive impact on the value of a company due to 
institutional investors being attracted to the company (Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  Hassan et al., (2009) argued 
that the association between the two variables is complicated and depends upon whether the exposure is 
voluntary or mandatory. However, the authors found no significant link between firm value and the 
voluntary exposure made by Egyptian companies, whereas they identified a negative and significant 
relationship between company value and mandatory exposure. Moreover, Uyar and Kilic (2012) established 
that the link between discretionary disclosure and firm value is influenced by the measurement of firm 
value. For example, when they used market-to-book value as opposed to market capitalisation as the 
dependent variable in the regression model, their findings went from positive to insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, earlier investigations that examined the effect of disclosure on company value reported mixed 
findings as previously emphasised. The limited empirical literature examining the relationship between 
market value firms and voluntary disclosure suggests a positive relationship between the two variables 
(Baek et al., 2004, Lim et al., 2007; Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012), for instance, 
Anam et al. (2011) and Sheu et al. (2010) reported that discretionary disclosure levels in Malaysia and 
Taiwan are associated with company value. Correspondingly, Silva and Alves (2004) established that 
financial information discretionarily reported by Latin American companies has a significant and positive 
relationship with company value. However, Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Elzahar et al., (2015) claimed that 
the link between discretionary exposure and company value differs according to the proxy employed for 
the market value of the firm, and Hassan et al., (2009) reported that the association between the two 
variables depends on the type of disclosure used. Vafaei et al.’s (2011) study included both developed and 
developing countries and documented that there is a significant association between disclosure and firm 
value for Hong Kong and the UK and reported a negative relationship between the two variables for 
Singapore and Australia. Therefore, based on the above discussion the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H: there is a positive association between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure ANF rim value 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
An assertion has been made by Linsley and Shrives (2006) that there is a difficulty in considering any risk 
disclosure investigation, which is to clearly identify risk information. Thereforth, it is crucial to impeccably 
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define risk. Yet, defining risk can be problematic as the level of management control over risk varies in 
accordance to the type of risk, for example, financial risk could be controlled by financial instruments and 
other risks are operational (Schrand and Elliott, 1998).   
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the researchers adopted a well-defined and fit for purpose risk 
disclosure definition by Linsley and Shrives (2006, p.3), who defined risk reporting as “If the reader is 
informed of any opportunity or prospect or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or exposure, which has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the future or of the management 
of any such opportunity prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”.  
 
Risk Disclosure Theories 
  
A number of different theories have been proposed to explain why companies report risk information. 
However, there is no single theory which can explain the phenomena of disclosure as a whole, thus 
Researchers tend to choose the most articulated theory with their study’s hypotheses (Linsley and Shrives, 
2000). This section will consider the theoretical perspectives employed for the purpose of this study. 
Modern firms are reknowned by the detachment of ownership from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and 
this contributes to the widening information gap between managers (insiders) and investors (outsiders). 
Thus, there is a great need for corporate risk disclosure as it represents a vital line of communications 
between the two parties.  Cooke (1989) argued that where there is a detachment of ownership from control, 
the likelihood of agency costs arises due to disagreement between shareholders and managers and between 
bondholders and shareholder-managers. Also, Healy and Palepu (2001), Verrecchia (2001) and Hassan et 
al., (2009) contended that the need for more corporate disclosure arises from the information asymmetry 
problem. Henceforth, enhancing voluntary disclosure can reduce such conflicts and lessen future corporate 
performance uncertainty as well as facilitate trading in shares hence increases firm valuation (Hassan et al., 
2009).   
 
The influence of disclosure on firm value can be explained based on signalling theory. A number of prior 
researches have attempted to highlight the relationship between firm value and voluntary disclosure based 
on signalling theory (Gordon et al., 2010; Anam et al., 2011). All-inclusive disclosure indicates better 
corporate governance management and fewer agency conflicts, leading to a higher market valuation of the 
firm (Sheu et al., 2010).  In addition, Gordon et al. (2010) asserted that voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports sends a clear signal to the capital market that is likely to increase a firm’s present net value and in 
turn its stock market value. Gallego-Alvarez et al., (2010) argued that disclosure has a positive consequence 
on shareholder value creation. While, Cormier et al., (2011) claimed that, disclosure supplies value-relevant 
information to stock markets.  In essence, signalling theory implies that a company will try to signal good 
news to investors and other interested groups by disclosing more voluntarily (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
Moreover, Linsley and Shrives (2005) posited that signalling theory is the most relevant theory in terms of 
illuminating the phenomena of voluntary risk disclosure. Furthermore, some previous investigations have 
reported that increasing the levels of voluntary disclosure culminates in less misevaluation of share prices, 
thus increasing firms’ market value (Anam et al., 2011).   
 
Moreover, according to the signalling theory, when a firm’s performance is good, directors will prefer to 
signal their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the market by reporting more supplementary 
information, whilst directors of firms that are performing badly do not. In fact, such disclosure by managers 
has many advantages, such as improved reputation of a firm, higher liquidity of stocks and increased market 
valuation of a firm, whereas when firms keep silent, investors and the rest of the market can misinterpret 
this as them withholding the worst possible information (Spence 1973; Verrecchia, 1983; Strong and 
Walker, 1987; Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). Increased information 
disclosure allows shareholders to make accurate assessments of the fundamental parameters in relation the 
future stock returns, decreasing non-diversifiable estimation risk and uncertainty in relation to future cash 
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flows as well as future profitability (Clarkson et al., 1996). Also through augmented disclosure, the 
willingness for shareholders to trade is improved and enhances the liquidation of shares cultivating in an 
increased firm value (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). 
 
It has been noted that some organisations restrict their disclosures to only mandatory disclosure, whereas 
others might aim for more transparency and the disclosure of other supplementary information. Also, it has 
been established by prior investigations that traditional mandatory disclosure is unsuccessful in capturing 
value relevant information (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hussainey and Walker, 2009), whilst previous 
literature has claimed that there are a number of advantages to voluntary disclosure (Nikhil et al., 2015). 
Moreover, directors could opt for more voluntarily disclosure of information regarding their risk 
management and the methods used to deal with risks in their organisation as a means of conveying the 
firm’s genuine value to external investors (Merkley, 2014). Furthermore, increased voluntary disclosure is 
predicted to increase stock liquidity by diminishing transaction costs and raising the demand for shares 
hence increase future profitability. It is also predicted that improved disclosure will decrease uncertainty 
surrounding the estimation of stock returns. Furthermore, the rate of return required by company 
shareholders will be reduced, the company’s capital costs will plummet and the company’s market value 
will rise. Moreover, prior studies have found that increased information disclosure can impact upon a 
company’s market value by increasing the actual cash flow to investors as a consequence decreases agency 
conflicts (Lambert et al., 2007).This study incorporates as control variables a number of firm-specific 
characteristics, corporate governance attributes and board demographic traits which are discussed in the 
previous study. (For more information see Table 2).  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN-METHODOLOGY 
 
This section describes the sample, the sources of relevant information and the data collection procedure and 
defines all variables used for the purpose of this investigation.  This study’s sample incorporates all banks 
listed on the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) over a five-year period from 2009 to 2013. Initially, the 
researchers set out to undertake this empirical study over a ten-year period. However, as four banks did not 
have their market to book values for the entire period and some of them were not even listed ten years ago, 
the study period was shortened in order to include the entire population of listed banks in Saudi Arabia. 
According to SAMA (2015) there are only 12 listed Saudi banks on Tadawul. The data collection process 
was undertaken via manual content analysis of all the annual reports of the banks as well as some variables 
were collected from DataStream and Bloomberg. All reports were downloaded from the banks’ websites. 
Kothari et al., (2009) indicate that annual reports are usually favoured as information source since they 
provide information which enables external shareholder to better understand the true economic picture of 
the firm.  
 
For this investigation to examine the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks a risk disclosure 
index, which is a checklist of different disclosure items included in banks’ annual reports, was developed 
(see Arvidsson, 2003). For the purpose of constructing the risk disclosure indexes, an extensive review of 
prior studies was undertaken (e.g. Hassan, 2009; Al-Shammari, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). Therefore, for 
an item to be included, it must have been used in previous published disclosure studies. Hence, the following 
steps were taken as the basis for the development of the risk disclosure indices for this study:  
 
Step 1: A comprehensive review of the prior risk disclosure literature was undertaken (e.g. ICAEW, 1997, 
2000; Hassan, 2009; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Al-Shammari, 2014; Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 
2015). Based on this, the researchers identified some items which were used in previous studies. Therefore, 
the annual reports of listed Saudi banks should contain and disclose. 
 
Step 2: The index were reviewed with 2 independent researchers who deal with bank reports and specialize 
in the area of disclosure and financial reporting to enhance the validity of the study, index and results. 
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Therefore, a risk disclosure index was developed solely for the purpose of measuring the level of voluntary 
risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. This is similar to the approach used by prior voluntary risk disclosure 
investigations (e.g. Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015). The risk disclosure index included a total of 54 
items that were expected to be published in the annual reports of the sample banks, which were divided 
across 8 categories: accounting policies, financial and other risks, derivative hedging and general risks 
information, financial instruments, reserves, segment information, business risk and compliance with 
regulations. Moreover, one of the important issues during crafting the disclosure index was deciding 
whether some items should be weighted more heavily (i.e. important) than others. In accounting research, 
both weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices are utilized (Cooke, 1989; Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Raffournier, 1995). For the purpose of this study, the un-weighted disclosure index 
was chosen because the study does not focus on a particular user group (Alsaeed, 2006; Naser et al., 2006). 
Instead the study addresses all users of annual reports, and therefore there is no need to confer different 
importance levels to the disclosed risk items (Oliveira et al., 2006). The contents of each bank’s annual 
reports were compared to the items listed in the Appendix, and on the basis of a dichotomous model they 
were coded as 1 if disclosed or 0 if otherwise. This index coincides with other studies that quantify the 
extent of disclosure (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Barako et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998; Oliveira et al., 2006). The total score for a bank is: 
 
TD = � dini=1  (1) 
 
Where d = 1 if the item is disclosed; 0 = if the item is not disclosed; n = number of items.   
 
Weber (1988) argued that the classification procedure should be reliable and valid. The reliability and 
validity of content analysis approaches need to be reviewed carefully. In human-scored schemes, reliability, 
that is the reproducibility of the measurement, is a major concern (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). The preceding studies argued that content analysis is not reliable if it is conducted only once 
or only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). Consequently, to ensure the content validity of the initial 
research instrument, it was reviewed independently by two other researchers. Subsequently, after the 
researcher received the independent researcher’s comments and suggestions. A fourth experienced 
academic was required to discuss any ambiguities raised. The final disclosure checklist included 54 items. 
In terms of validity the research instrument (disclosure index) is valid if they can measure what they claim 
to measure (Field, 2009). In this study the index has measure what it claimed to measure; therefore the 
researcher can safely claim that the research instrument is valid. To ensure the reliability of the research 
instrument, the author and the two independent researchers scored three randomly selected banks. Then, 
the results from the three researchers were compared. Given that the final research disclosure index was 
agreed by all researchers, differences in the compliance scores from the researchers were insignificant. This 
method was adopted by Marston and Shrives (1991), who argued that the index scores awarded to firm 
could be considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same results.  The final disclosure 
checklist is presented in Table 1. 
 
Dependent variable:  This study uses two different proxies for measuring firm value. Firstly it uses the 
market based measure which is the natural logarithm of market to book value at end of year (MTBV). This 
is in line with previous studies (Hassan et al., 2009; Uyar and Kilic, 2012). Secondly, it uses the accounting 
based measure, which is the return of assets (ROA). This is consistent with (Garay et al., 2013; Aras et al., 
2010). Two measures examinations have different theoretical implications (Hillman and Keim, 2001). The 
current study employs two dependent variables related to firm value to test the hypothesis of the study. This 
is concurrent with preceding literature (Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Sheu et al., 2010). These two models 
measure how the level of voluntary risk disclosure affects the market value of the bank. This study’s main 
emphasis is on exploring the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm market 
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value. An extensive line of preceding literature has argued that discretionary disclosure is better used as an 
instrument intended to reduce information asymmetries and satisfy shareholders’ information demands. 
The aim of this research is to investigate whether increased discretionary risk disclosure affects the firm’s 
market value.  
 
Table 1: Ensuring Validity of Research Instrument  
 
Categories 
Items Suggested by 
Author 
Items Suggested by First 
Independent Researcher 
Items Suggested By Second 
Independent Researcher 
Final Index After 
Consultation 
Weight 
Accounting Policies 12 13 9 10 18.51% 
Financial risks 15 18 10 15 27.7% 
Derivatives hedging and 
General Risk Info 
1 3 2 11 20.37% 
Financial instruments 3 2 3 2 3.7% 
Reserves 4 3 2 3 5.5% 
Segment information 2 2 2 2 3.7% 
Business risk  5 3 4 5 9.25% 
Compliance with 
regulations 
7 11 3 6 11.11% 
Total 49 55 35 54 100% 
The weight is calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (67). For example: weight of Accounting Policies = 
10/67*100= 15% 
 
Endogenous variable: Risk Disclosure; which proxies for the level of voluntary risk disclosure of all banks 
included in the sample of the study. The level of voluntary risk disclosure is the totality of the scores attained 
from 54 items that fall into 8 different categories of information (See appendix).  The level of voluntary 
risk disclosure was calculated based on an un-weighted (Dichotomous) risk disclosure index, whereby an 
item is assigned a score of 1 if it is disclosed and a score of 0 if otherwise (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Hassan et 
al., 2009).  This measure was preferred since the research does not concentrate on a specific user group 
(Naser et al., 2006) but rather addresses all users of annual reports. Thus, there is no need to put different 
weights on the reported risk items (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
 
Table 2: Summary of Variable Names, Description and Sources 
 
Abbreviated 
Name 
Full Name Variable Description Predicted 
Sign 
Data 
Source 
Prior Studies 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
FV 
 
 
 
Firm value  
Natural logarithm of the ratio of market 
value of equity to book value of 
equity at the financial year-end 
(MTBV) 
  
 
 
DataStream 
 
Hassan et al., (2009); Uyar and Kilic 
(2012); Nekhili et al., (2015); Lins, (2003) 
ROA (Return On Assets)  Garay et al., (2013); Aras et al., (2010); 
Klapper and Love,( 2002) 
Independent 
Variable 
     
RISKD Risk disclosure  Risk disclosure level based on risk 
index  
 Annual 
reports 
Hassan et al., (2009); Uyar and Kilic 
(2012); Nekhili et al., (2015); (2015); Nitm 
et al. (2013) 
Control Variables  
1. Firm-specific Characteristics  
SIZE Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets + DataStream Elshandidy et al. (2013); Elzahar and 
hussainey (2012); (2007); Mokhtar and 
Mellet, (2013); Nekhili et al., (2015) 
PROF Profitability ROA (Return On Assets) + DataStream  Nitm et al. (2013); Nekhili et al., (2015);  
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012); Uyar and 
Kilic (2012); Elshandidy and Neri (2015) 
LEV Leverage Long-term debt/ total assets   + DataStream  Abraham and Cox (2007); Nekhili et al., 
(2015); Uyar and Kilic (2012); (Hassan et 
al 2009); Nitm et al. (2013) 
LIQ Liquidity Current Ratio: Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities 
+ Annual 
report 
Mokhtar and Mellet, (2013); Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012); Elshandidy and Neri 
(2015);  
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DIVID Dividend payout Dividends per share  + DataStream Elshandidy and Neri (2015) 
2. Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 BSIZE Board size Number of board members + Annual 
report 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015); Nekhili et al., 
(2015); Mokhtar and Mellet, (2013); Nitm 
et al. (2013); Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012); 
CHS Internal 
Ownership 
Percentage of shares held by internal 
shareholders 
- DataStream Elshandidy et al. (2013); Nitm et al. 
(2013); Nitm et al. (2012); Marshall and 
Weetman, (2007); Elshandidy, (2014); 
Firth et al., 2007 
NOCH-Factors   External 
Ownership  
Percentage of shares held by external 
shareholders  
+ DataStream Elshandidy et al. (2013); Nitm et al. 
(2013); Nitm et al. (2012); Elshandidy and 
Neri (2015); Deumes and Knechel, 
( 2008); Elshandidy, (2014); Firth et al., 
2007 
INDEP Independent 
directors 
Number of non-executive directors  on 
the board of directors 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Abraham and Cox (2007); Elshandidy et 
al. (2013); Alergini and Greco (2013); 
Oliveira et al., (2011); Allini et al. (2015); 
Allini et al., (2014) 
NON Non-executive 
directors 
Dummy variable 1 if board contains 
non-executive directors and otherwise 
0. 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report  
Gul & Leung, (2004); Cheng & Courtenay 
(2006); Elshandidy et al. (2013); Nitm et 
al. (2013); Elshandidy and Neri (2015);   
ACINDEP Audit committee 
independence  
Dummy variable; 1 if an audit 
committee independence exists, and 0 
otherwise 
+ Bloomberg 
Annual 
Report 
Nekhili et al., (2015); Taylor (2011); 
Oliveira et al., (2011b); Neri, (2010)  
ACSIZE Audit committee 
size 
Number of audit committee members + Annual 
report 
Felo et al. (2003); Elzahar and Hussainey 
(2012); Tauringana and Mangena (2009); 
Mangena and Pike (2005) 
ACMEET Audit committee 
meetings 
Number of audit committee meetings + Annual 
report 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005); Alergini 
and Greco (2013); O’Sullivan et al. 
(2008); Allini et al. (2015) 
3. Demographic Characteristics 
EDUC Education Number of board members holding a 
PhD  
+ Annual 
report 
Allini et al. (2015) 
TENU Tenure Dummy variable 1 if the number of 
years the board member permanence on 
the board is above the sample median 
of 5 years, otherwise 0. 
+ Annual 
report 
Chung et al., (2015)  
GENDER Gender Number of females on the board  + Annual 
report 
Allini et al. (2015); Nitm et al. (2013); 
Allini et al. (2014)  
DIVE Diversity  Number of other nationalities on the 
board   
+ Annual 
report 
Nitm et al. (2013); Allini et al. (2015);  
This table provides the description and measures of risk disclosure reporting, as dependent variables, and firm characteristics, corporate 
governance mechanism and demographic traits as independent variables. It also provides the source of each variable. 
 
Model Development  
 
The aim of this research is to examine the association between firm value and voluntary risk disclosure 
level. Moreover, since all of the selected variables can affect firm value directly or indirectly by affecting 
the level of voluntary risk disclosure two synchronised models, wherein the level of voluntary risk 
disclosure is a strategic choice that relies on a wide range of variables, was developed (see Table 2).    
The market based measure: 
 ���� = �0 + β1 RISKD + β2 NOCH− FACTOR + β3 BSIZE + β4 INDEP + β5 NON +β6 ACINDEP + β7 ACSIZE + β8 ACMEET + β9 EDUC + β10 TENU + β11 GENDER +
 β12 DIVE +  β13 SIZE +  β14 PROF + β15 CHS + β16 LEV + β17 LIQ + β18 DIVID + ɛ (2) 
 
Where:  
FV = Firm Value (measure by MTBV)   
β0 = the intercept   
Β1….. β18 = regression coefficients (See table 2 for explanation) 
ɛ = error term  
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I = Bank  
T = Year 
 
The accounting based measure: 
              ���� = �0 + β1 RISKD + β2 NOCH − FACTOR + β3 BSIZE + β4 INDEP + β5 NON +β6 ACINDEP + β7 ACSIZE + β8 ACMEET + β9 EDUC + β10 TENU + β11 GENDER +  β12 DIVE +
 β13 SIZE +  β14CHS  + β15 LEV + β16 LIQ + β17 DIVID + ɛ     (3) 
Where:  
 
FV = Firm Value (measure by ROA)   
β0 = the intercept   
Β1….. β17 = regression coefficients (See table 2 for explanation) 
ɛ = error term  
I = Bank  
T = Year 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS   
 
Table 3 presents the summary descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses to determine the 
empirical directional or non-directional relationship between firm value and the voluntary risk disclosure 
levels in banks listed on the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul). A number of interesting findings emerged from 
the descriptive statistics. It demonstrated a great disparity in voluntary risk reporting practices among the 
sample population. For example, RISKD ranged from a minimum of 51 percent to a maximum of 78 percent, 
with an average of 66.03 percent of voluntary risk disclosure levels in the sample. Also, it showed that the 
average market to book value of listed banks in Saudi Arabia is 1.72 percent with a maximum value of 4.02 
and a minimum value of 0 percent. 
 
The figures for all control variables (which were generated from corporate governance, demographic 
attributes and firm-specific characteristics) are presented in the next paragraph as minimum, maximum and 
mean values in percentages. (Also see table 3). Table 3 demonstrates that CHS holdings has in this model 
reported quite a large variation ranging from 0 percent for the minimum and 69 percent for the maximum 
with a mean of 19.1 percent. This phenomenon could be attributed to the nature of the ownership structure 
in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where some banks are wholly owned by a single family who sets on the 
board of directors and act as internal shareholders. Alrajhi bank is an example of such structure. While, 
Table 3 shows that NOCH holdings has reported a minimum of 25 percent, a maximum of 45 percent and 
a mean of 29.5 percent. Also, Table 3 illustrates that BSIZE ranges from 7 members to a maximum of 11 
on the board of directors, with an average mean of 9 members. Whereas, the INDEP members of the board 
recorded an average mean of 5 members with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 8. Table 2 also shows 
that NON members have a minimum of 1 member to a maximum of 11 members with an average mean of 
7. The Table below illustrates that the descriptive statistics for the ACIND which has recorded a minimum 
of 0 members and a maximum of 1 audit committee independent member.  ACSIZE has a mean of 3 
members with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 5. For the audit committee frequency of meetings (ACM) 
Table 3 shows that there is a minimum of 3 meetings, a maximum of 11 and an average mean 5.  Further, 
GEN has a minimum of 0 members and a maximum of 1 on the board of directors. TENU has recorded a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, while EDUC recorded a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. Also 
DIVE recorded a maximum of 1. Table 3 also demonstrates that SIZE has an average mean of 8, a minimum 
of 7 and a maximum of 7.60 percent. While, PROF has a maximum of .04, a minimum of -.01 and a mean 
of .019. LEV on the other hand has a maximum of 13.7, a minimum of 0 percent and an average mean of 
0.57. LIQ has reported in the table below a minimum of 1.10, a maximum of 10 percent and a mean of 1.4. 
Lastly, DIVID has reported a minimum of 0, a maximum of 69 and a mean of 25 percent.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Included in this Study of MTBV 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
FV 60 0.00 4.02 1.7218 0.70914 
RISKD 60 0.51 0.78 0.6603 0.07059 
CHS 60 0.00 69.00 19.1000 17.46056 
NOCH 60 25.00 45.00 29.5000 5.08091 
BSIZE 60 7.00 11.00 9.5500 0.94645 
INDEP 60 3.00 8.00 5.1333 1.62049 
NON 60 1 11 7.37 2.718 
ACINDEP 60 0.00 1.00 0.7500 0.43667 
ACSIZE 60 2.00 5.00 3.7667 0.96316 
ACMEET 60 3.00 11.00 5.3667 1.95688 
GENDER 60 0.00 1.00 0.0833 0.27872 
TENU 60 0.00 1.00 0.6000 0.49403 
EDUC 60 0.00 1.00 0.7000 0.46212 
DIVE 60 0.00 1.00 0.3333 0.47538 
SIZE 60 7.24 8.58 7.9940 0.35203 
PROF 60 -0.01 0.04 0.0192 0.00869 
LEV 60 0.00 13.76 0.5780 2.04382 
LIQ 60 1.10 10.89 1.4118 1.26123 
DIVID 60 0.00 69.15 25.8103 21.41391 
Valid N (listwise) 60 
    
Note: This table presents the descriptive analysis for all variables used in the regression model for the purpose of this study. FV: Firm value 
(Market to Book Value); RISKD: Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares 
held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factors: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size 
(Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive 
directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy 
variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); 
ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure 
(Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: 
Education (Number of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural 
logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets); LEV: Leverage (Long-term debt/ total assets); LIQ: Liquidity (Current Ratio: 
Current Assets/Current Liabilities); DIVID: Dividend payout (Dividends per share). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
 
Market-Based Measure Results 
 
Table 4 illustrates the correlations between firm value and the levels of voluntary risk disclosure along with 
the correlations for the other explanatory variables. It also presents the Pearsons correlation matrix for all 
variables employed in this study’s regression analysis to check for multicollinearity. Bivariate analysis was 
used to check for multicollinearity. When the level of association between the risk disclosure score and 
firm value, measured by the market to book value at end of year and other associations between the control 
variables, was legitimately low, this indicated that there were no multicollinearity problems. Later in the 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis, the calculated variance inflation factor (VIF) values 
support the absence of multicollinearity defects as multicollinearity did not exceed the 10 percent mark 
(Naser et al., 2006; Field, 2009).  
 
Similarly, Pearsons correlation matrix was used to test for the directional and non-directional relationships 
between firm value and the rest of the control variables. This study further examined residual statistics and 
Durbin-Watson statistics for linearity and autocorrelation problems (See Model Summary in Table 5). 
However, the tests showed no serious violation of these linear assumptions. In addition, the Table illustrates 
that there is no statistically significant association between the dependent variable (FV based on MTBV) 
and the endogenous variable (RISKD) of this investigation. However, there are a number of statistically 
significant associations between the dependent variable and the control variables. For example, CHS, 
BSIZE, PROF and DIVID are statistically significant and positively associated to FV, while EDUC is 
statistically significant and negatively correlated to FV. The highest correlation that can be seen from Table 
4 is between BSIZE and FV at a value of 0.604, followed by EDUC at a value of 0.463. Also, Table 4 
indicates that there are insignificant correlations between the rest of the control variable and the dependent 
variable (Based on the market measure). 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Analysis   
 
 MTBV RISKD CHS NOCH BSIZE INDEP NON ACIND ACSIZE ACM 
MTBV 1 0.062 0.459** -0.016 0.604** -0.029 0.171 -0.212 0.174 0.243 
RISKD 0.062 1   -0.129 0.411** -0.107 -0.171 -0.095 0.074 0.136 0.054 
CHS 0.459** -0.129 1  -0.492** 0.364** 0.195 0.290* -0.190 0.243 0.196 
NOCH -0.016 0.411** -0.492** 1 0.073 -0.248 -0.308* 0.325* -0.062 0.153 
BSIZE 0.604** -0.107 0.364** 0.073 1 -.038 0.467** -0.072 0.013 0.566** 
INDEP -0.029 -0.171 0.195 -0.248 -0.038 1 0.439** 0.335** 0.335** 0.075 
NON 0.171 -0.095 0.290* -0.308* 0.467** 0.439** 1 0.050 0.454** 0.459** 
ACIND -0.212 0.074 -0.190 0.325* -0.072 0.335** 0.050 1 0.141 -0.089 
ACSIZE 0.174 0.136 0.243 -0.062 0.013 0.335** 0.454** 0.141 1 0.190 
ACM 0.243 0.054 0.196 0.153 0.566** 0.075 0.459** 0-.089 0.190 1 
GEND -0.026 0.093 0.061 -0.215 0.016 0.050 0.138 0.174 -0.242 -0.212 
 TENU 0.048 -0.356** 0.195 -0.218 0.007 0.110 -0.103 -0.079 0.121 0.014 
EDUC -0.463** -0.241 -0.059 -0.173 -0.081 0.326* 0.251 0.294* -0.046 0.030 
DIVE 0.075 0.375** -0.261* 0.547** 0.226 -0.169 0.114 0.408** -0.086 -0.024 
SIZE 0.193 0.479** 0.006 0.071 0.101 -0.478** -0.052 -0.225 0.019 -0.055 
PROF 0.410** 0.271* 0.329* -0.227 0.283* -0.172 0.200 -0.279* 0.219 0.158 
LEV 0.067 -0.093 0.049 -0.052 0.002 0.190 0.083 -0.062 -0.137 -0.123 
LIQ -0.106 -0.294* 0.063 -0.114 -0.069 -0.016 -0.174 -0.274* -0.121 -0.093 
DIVID 0.307* 0.318* 0.232 -0.113 0.135 -0.079 0.168 -0.086 0.302* -0.004 
 GEN TENU EDUC DIVE SIZE PROF LEV LIQ DIVID 
MTBV -0.026 0.048 -0.463** 0.075 0.193 0.410** 0.067 -0.106 0.307* 
RISKD 0.093 -0.356** -0.241 0.375** 0.479** 0.271* -0.093 -0.294* 0.318* 
CHS 0.061 0.195 -0.059 -0.261* 0.006 0.329* 0.049 0.063 0.232 
NOCH -0.215 -0.218 -0.173 0.547** 0.071 -0.227 -0.052 -0.114 -0.113 
BSIZE 0.016 0.007 -0.081 0.226 0.101 0.283* 0.002 -0.069 0.135 
INDEP 0.050 0.110 0.326* -0.169 -0.478** -0.172 0.190 -0.016 -0.079 
NON 0.138 -0.103 0.251 0.114 -0.052 0.200 0.083 -0.174 0.168 
ACIND 0.174 -0.079 0.294* 0.408** -0.225 -0.279* -0.062 -0.274* -0.086 
ACSIZE -0.242 0.121 -0.046 -0.086 0.019 0.219 -0.137 -0.121 0.302* 
ACME -0.212 0.014 0.030 -0.024 -0.055 0.158 -0.123 -0.093 -0.004 
GEN 1 -0.246 0.197 0.426** -0.166 -0.181 0.336** -0.054 -0.111 
 TENU -0.246 1 0.134 -0.433** -0.126 0.039 -0.091 0.108 -0.045 
EDUC 0.197 0.134 1 0.077 -0.211 -0.148 0.123 0.114 -0.167 
DIVE 0.426** -0.433** 0.077 1 .112 -0.055 0.103 -0.085 -0.040 
SIZE -0.166 -0.126 -0.211 0.112 1 0.529** -0.166 -0.299* 0.658** 
PROF -0.181 0.039 -0.148 -0.055 0.529** 1 -0.398** -0.011 0.557** 
LEV 0.336** -0.091 0.123 0.103 -0.166 -0.398** 1 0.009 -0.233 
LIQ -0.054 0.108 0.114 -0.085 -0.299* -0.011 0.009 1 -0.167 
DIVID -0.111 -0.045 -0.167 -0.040 0.658** 0.557** -0.233 -0.167 1 
FV: Firm value (year-end Market to Book Value); RISKD: Risk disclosure score (from an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership 
(Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factors: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); 
BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive board of director members); NON: Non-
executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACIND: Audit committee independence (Dummy 
variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); ACM: 
Audit committee meetings (Number of audit committee meetings); GEN: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy 
variable 1 if the number of years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: 
Education (Number of board members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural 
logarithm of total assets); PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets); LEV: Leverage (Long-term debt/ total assets); LIQ: Liquidity (Current Ratio: 
Current Assets/Current Liabilities); DIVID: Dividend payout (Dividends per share). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.  ** Denote 
correlation is significant at the 5% level (tow-tailed tests). * Denote correlation is significant at the 10% level (tow-tailed tests). 
 
For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between firm value and voluntary risk disclosure 
(Based on the market measure), a multivariate analysis, which controls for other variables expected to 
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impact upon the value of the firm, was conducted. The method used to study the relationship between firm 
value and voluntary risk disclosure levels in all listed Saudi banks was the ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression analysis. The results of the regression are presented in Table 5. This study’s model used a market 
based measure; market to book value at year-end at the end as the dependent variable, total risk disclosure 
score as its endogenous variable and a mixture of corporate governance, demographic attributes and firm-
specific characteristics as control variables (see Table 2). As can be observed from the model summary in 
Table 5 that the model is significant at the (0.000) level with an F value of (6.651) and with an adjusted R 
square of 0.672 percent. Therefore, the explanatory power of the independent and control variables on firm 
value are fairly high. However, based on this model the regression analysis Table indicates that there is an 
insignificant relationship between firm value and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks. 
Therefore, this study’s hypothesis is rejected in this model. The results are consistent with previous studies, 
such as Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Hassan et al., (2009). This investigation’s outcome based on the market 
based measure (MTBV) is inconsistent with the signalling theory, which indicates that when a firm’s 
performance is good, directors will signal their firm’s performance to their investors and the rest of the 
market by reporting more information voluntarily, whilst directors of firms that are performing badly will 
not do so. The purpose of such disclosure is to obtain a good market reputation and increase firm value 
since investors and the rest of the market may misinterpret a firm keeping silent as it is withholding the 
worst possible information (Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). This 
research model finding is attributed to the deep-rooted tendency of the Saudi capital market to be opaque 
(Kamla and Roberts, 2010) and explained by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, where Saudi Arabia scored 
zero on the secrecy vs. transparency measure.  
 
Table 5 also presents the multivariate analysis for all of the control variables, where BSIZE has a positively 
significant relationship with firm value at 5% level. Also, there is a positively significant relationship 
between PROF and firm value at 10% level. In addition, LEV has a positively significant association with 
firm value at 10% level, while there are negatively significant associations between EDUC and LIQ and 
firm value at 1% and 10% levels, respectively.  However, the rest of the control variables are split between 
two groups, the first group being negatively insignificant and the second group being insignificantly 
associated with firm value.    
 
Accounting-Based Measure Results 
 
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and continuous independent variables. Consistent 
with this study’s hypothesis, the levels of voluntary risk disclosure is positively significant with firm value 
based on ROA at a value of (0.271*). It signifies that the overall level of voluntary risk disclosure of all 
Saudi listed banks has strong impact on profitability. The correlation matrix also shows the 
interrelationships with this model’s explanatory variables. It shows that CHS (0.329*); BSIZE (0.283*); 
SIZE (0.529**); DIVID (0.557**) are positively correlated with firm value. While, ACINDEP (-0.279*) 
and LEV (-0.398**) are negatively associated with firm value based on the second model. In terms of the 
other control variables, the correlation between them and firm value based on ROA is insignificant.  
 
This study also presents the regression results for the second model, which shows the analysis of the 
association between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm value (Based on the accounting 
measure). As can be observed from the model summary in Table 7 that the model is significant at the (0.000) 
level with an F value of (4.547) and with an adjusted R square of (0.505 %). Therefore, the explanatory 
power of the independent and control variables on firm value based on ROA are fairly high. However, the 
accounting based measure indicates in the Table below that there is a positively significant relationship 
between firm value and the level of voluntary risk disclosure in Saudi listed banks at a value of (0.031). 
Therefore, this study’s hypothesis is accepted. The results are consistent with Botosan and Plumlee, (2002) 
who found that increased levels of disclosure have a positive economic consequence on profitability and 
value of the firm. Also, this finding is in line with the limited empirical literature examining the relationship 
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between firm value firm and voluntary disclosure, which documented a positive relationship between the 
two variables (Baek et al., 2004, Lim et al., 2007; Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Nekhili et al., 2012). 
This result also supports Gallego-Alvarez et al., (2010) who have reported in their study that disclosure has 
a positive consequence on shareholder value creation. 
 
This study’s findings based on the accounting measure is consistent with the signalling theory, which 
indicates that when a firm’s performance is good, directors will signal their firm’s performance to their 
investors and the rest of the market by reporting more information voluntarily. The purpose of such 
disclosure is to obtain a good market reputation, increase the trade of shares and thus increase firm value 
(Mohobbot, 2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2000; 2006; Hassan, 2009). Moreover, Gordon et al. (2010) asserted 
that voluntary disclosure in annual reports sends a clear signal to the capital market that is likely to increase 
a firm’s present net value and in turn its stock market value. This model’s finding is consistent with results 
of previous studies, which adopted signalling theory (Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010; Curado et al., 
2011). This positive association supports the traditional view that more information complements firms’ 
value.  
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis  
 
 Coefficientsa 
Model Beta t Sig. VIF 
(Constant)  0.725 0.473 
 
RISKD -0.111 -0.811 0.422 3.436 
CHS 0.038 0.259 0.797 3.848 
NOCH -0.164 -0.825 0.414 7.193 
BSIZE 0.400 2.809 0.008** 3.716 
INDEP 0.067 0.486 0.630 3.493 
NON -0.212 -1.194 0.240 5.777 
ACINDEP -0.091 -0.713 0.480 3.000 
ACSIZE 0.111 0.943 0.352 2.522 
ACMEET 0.094 0.708 0.484 3.230 
GENDER -0.008 -0.054 0.958 3.774 
TENU 0.056 0.555 0.582 1.879 
EDUC -0.379 -3.842 0.000*** 1.779 
DIVE 0.270 1.487 0.145 6.046 
SIZE -0.117 -0.691 0.494 5.227 
PROF 0.336 2.552 0.015* 3.184 
LEV 0.166 1.721 0.094* 1.700 
LIQ -0.195 -1.902 0.065* 1.926 
DIVID 0.132 1.023 0.313 3.048 
Model Summary: Adjusted R Square: 0.678; F value: 6.651; Sig. :  0.000. Notes: FV: Firm value (Market to Book Value at year-end); RISKD: 
Risk disclosure score (based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); 
NOCH-Factors: External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); 
INDEP: Independent directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 
if board contains non-executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee 
independence exists, and 0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings 
(Number of audit committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure (Dummy variable 1 if the number of 
years the board member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board 
members holding a PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); 
PROF: Profitability (Return On Assets); LEV: Leverage (Long-term debt/ total assets); LIQ: Liquidity (Current Ratio: Current Assets/Current 
Liabilities); DIVID: Dividend payout (Dividends per share). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. Note that “* ** ***” represent 10% 5% 
1% respectively, which indicates that there is a positive correlation or a proof of influence exists between the respective factors and “-“indicates 
that there is a negative correlation or proof. 
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Table 6: Pearson Correlation Analysis   
 
 
ROA RISKD CHS NOCH BSIZE INDEP NON ACINDEP ACSIZE 
ROA 1                 
RISKD 0.271* 1 -0.129 .411** -0.107 -0.171 -0.095 0.074 0.136 
CHS 0.329* -0.129 1 -.492** .364** 0.195 .290* -0.190 0.243 
NOCH -0.227 0.411** -0.492** 1 0.073 -0.248 -.308* .325* -0.062 
BSIZE 0.283* -0.107 0.364** 0.073 1 -0.038 .467** -0.072 0.013 
INDEP -0.172 -0.171 0.195 -0.248 -0.038 1 .439** .335** .335** 
NON 0.200 -0.095 0.290* -0.308* 0.467** 0.439** 1 0.050 .454** 
ACIND -0.279* 0.074 -0.190 0.325* -0.072 0.335** 0.050 1 0.141 
ACSIZE 0.219 0.136 0.243 -0.062 0.013 0.335** 0.454** 0.141 1 
ACM 0.158 0.054 0.196 0.153 0.566** 0.075 0.459** -0.089 0.190 
GEN -0.181 0.093 0.061 -0.215 0.016 0.050 0.138 0.174 -0.242 
TENU 0.039 -0.356** 0.195 -0.218 0.007 0.110 -0.103 -0.079 0.121 
EDUC -0.148 -0.241 -0.059 -0.173 -0.081 0.326* 0.251 0.294* -0.046 
DIVE -0.055 0.375** -0.261* 0.547** 0.226 -0.169 0.114 0.408** -0.086 
SIZE 0.529** 0.479** 0.006 0.071 0.101 -0.478** -0.052 -0.225 0.019 
LEV -0.398** -0.093 0.049 -0.052 0.002 0.190 0.083 -0.062 -0.137 
LIQ -0.011 -0.294* 0.063 -0.114 -0.069 -0.016 -0.174 -0.274* -0.121 
DIVID 0.557** 0.318* 0.232 -0.113 0.135 -0.079 0.168 -0.086 0.302* 
 
ACM GEN TENU EDUC DIVE SIZE LEV LIQ DIVID 
ROA                   
RISKD 0.054 0.093 -.356** -0.241 .375** .479** -0.093 -.294* .318* 
CHS 0.196 0.061 0.195 -0.059 -.261* 0.006 0.049 0.063 0.232 
NOCH 0.153 -0.215 -0.218 -0.173 .547** 0.071 -0.052 -0.114 -0.113 
BSIZE .566** 0.016 0.007 -0.081 0.226 0.101 0.002 -0.069 0.135 
INDEP 0.075 0.050 0.110 .326* -0.169 -.478** 0.190 -0.016 -0.079 
NON .459** 0.138 -0.103 0.251 0.114 -0.052 0.083 -0.174 0.168 
ACIND -0.089 0.174 -0.079 .294* .408** -0.225 -0.062 -.274* -0.086 
ACSIZE 0.190 -0.242 0.121 -0.046 -0.086 0.019 -0.137 -0.121 .302* 
ACM 1 -0.212 0.014 0.030 -0.024 -0.055 -0.123 -0.093 -0.004 
GEN -0.212 1 -0.246 0.197 .426** -0.166 .336** -0.054 -0.111 
TENU 0.014 -0.246 1 0.134 -.433** -0.126 -0.091 0.108 -0.045 
EDUC 0.030 0.197 0.134 1 0.077 -0.211 0.123 0.114 -0.167 
DIVE -0.024 0.426** -0.433** 0.077 1 0.112 0.103 -0.085 -0.040 
SIZE -0.055 -0.166 -0.126 -0.211 0.112 1 -0.166 -.299* .658** 
LEV -0.123 0.336** -0.091 0.123 0.103 -0.166 1 0.009 -0.233 
LIQ -0.093 -0.054 0.108 0.114 -0.085 -0.299* 0.009 1 -0.167 
DIVID -0.004 -0.111 -0.045 -0.167 -0.040 0.658** -0.233 -0.167 1 
This table shows the Pearson’s Correlation Analysis. 
 
The mixed results of this study are in line with Vafaei et al., (2011) who reports significant and insignificant 
association between disclosure and firm value in one study. These results confirm the findings of previous 
studies such as Uyar and Kilic (2012) and Elzahar et al., (2015) who claimed that the association between 
voluntary disclosure and firm value varies according to the proxy employed for the market value of the 
firm. Where, this study found in the first model based on the market based measure (MTBV) an insignificant 
correlation between firm value and the levels of voluntary risk disclosure. While, in the second model which 
was based on an accounting based measure (ROA) found a positively significant association between the 
two variables. This variation in the result between the two models can be justified based on the adoption of 
different measures of firm value (MTBV and ROA). Overall, a healthy amount of disclosure could result 
in desirable economic consequences such as a decrease in the cost of capital of a company (Beyer et al., 
2010) and an increase in the valuation of the firm (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
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Table 7: Regression Analysis 
 
Model Summary: Adjusted R Square: 0.505; F value: 4.547, Sig. :  0.000. Notes: FV: Firm value (Return On Assets); RISKD: Risk disclosure score 
(based on an unweighted disclosure index); CHS: Internal ownership (Percentage of shares held by internal shareholders); NOCH-Factors: 
External ownership (Percentage of shares held by all external shareholders); BSIZE: Board size (Number of board members); INDEP: Independent 
directors (Number of non-executive directors  on the board of directors); NON: Non-executive directors (Dummy variable 1 if board contains non-
executive directors and otherwise 0); ACINDEP: Audit committee independence (Dummy variable; 1 if audit committee independence exists, and 
0 otherwise); ACSIZE: Audit committee size (Number of audit committee members); ACMEET: Audit committee meetings (Number of audit 
committee meetings); GENDER: Gender (Number of females on the board); TENU: Tenure ( Dummy variable 1 if the number of years the board 
member permanence on the board is above the sample median of 5 years, otherwise 0); EDUC: Education (Number of board members holding a 
PhD); DIVE: Diversity (Number of other nationalities of the board ); SIZE: Bank size (Natural logarithm of total assets); LEV: Leverage (Long-
term debt/ total assets); LIQ: Liquidity (Current Ratio: Current Assets/Current Liabilities); DIVID: Dividend payout (Dividends per share). Table 
1 fully defines all the variables used. Note that “* ** ***” represent 10% 5% 1% respectively, which indicates that there is a positive correlation 
or a proof of influence exists between the respective factors and “-“indicates that there is a negative correlation or proof. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Prior research has explored the level of disclosure on firm value and its determinants; however, there is a 
dearth of literature on the effect of levels of disclosure on firm value in developing economies. The dearth 
is even greater when it comes to risk disclosure and firm value. Hence, there is a need for more research on 
the relationship between risk disclosure and firm value.  Thus this study contributes to the disclosure 
literature by being the first study to measure the economic consequences in the banking sector in developing 
markets. Prior research concentrated on risk disclosure in nonfinancial companies ignoring the banking 
industry and risk disclosure economic consequences in emerging economies (Hassan, 2005; Amran et al., 
2009; Abdullah and Hassan, 2013; Mousa and Elamir, 2013; Al-Shammari 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015). 
 
This study empirically examines the relationship between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm 
value of all Saudi listed banks. The findings of the multivariate analysis demonstrated that there is no 
association between the levels of voluntary risk disclosure and firm value as measured by the market to 
book value at the end of the year (MTBV). But, the results generate from the accounting based measure 
(ROA) show that there is a positively significant association between the levels of risk disclosure and firm 
value. This view is in line with Gelb and Zarowin (2002) who have documented that companies with high 
disclosure levels are more likely to demonstrate stronger levels of frim value.  In terms of the control 
variable, the findings indicated that there is a positively significant relationship between firm value and 
board size, profitability and leverage. This research’s outcomes showed that there are negatively significant 
associations between firm value and education and liquidity in the all listed banks in the first model. For 
the second model control variables BSIZE reported a positively significant relationship with firm value. 
Where, NOCH and LEV reported a negatively significant link with firm value. However, the rest of the 
control variables are split between two groups, the first group being negatively insignificant and the second 
group being insignificantly associated with firm value for both models.   
Model Beta t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 
 
-0.837 0.407 
 
RISKD 0.351 2.227 0.031* 2.971 
CHS 0.040 0.294 0.770 2.199 
NOCH -0.544 -2.410 0.020* 6.081 
BSIZE 0.284 1.720 0.093** 3.242 
INDEP -0.018 -0.116 0.908 2.883 
NON -0.070 -0.342 0.734 5.052 
ACINDEP -0.122 -0.832 0.410 2.561 
ACSIZE 0.051 0.367 0.715 2.330 
ACMEET -0.004 -0.027 0.979 2.796 
GENDER -0.273 -1.650 0.106 3.275 
TENU 0.057 0.496 0.623 1.558 
EDUC 0.035 0.292 0.772 1.758 
DIVE 0.281 1.345 0.186 5.197 
SIZE 0.132 0.666 0.509 4.703 
LEV -0.263 -2.361 0.023* 1.478 
LIQ 0.077 0.645 0.522 1.712 
DIVID 0.174 1.166 0.250 2.659 
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Even though a large body of prior research existed on the economic consequences of general disclosure, no 
prior research had been conducted on the relationship between risk disclosure and firm value. Therefore, 
this study contributes to the literature by being the first study to examine the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosure and its economic consequences as evidenced in the annual reports of banks. It also contributes 
to the general accounting disclosure literature and in particular contributes to the literature on risk disclosure 
in developing economies. In particular in the GCC states since no prior research has examined such 
relationships. In addition, it furthers the understanding of the role of accounting information in relation to 
market valuation of firms. Such studies about these markets are necessary and are fundamental in relation 
to ameliorating the weak transparency and disclosure situation by attracting the attention of regulatory 
institutions and corporation directors (Uyar and Kilic, 2012).   
 
This study has several important implications for banks’ investors, regulatory bodies and any other 
interested groups on the importance of corporate voluntary risk disclosure and its economic consequences 
and can be used to increase the value relevance in the banking sector. It also informs regulators about the 
current level of risk disclosure in all Saudi listed banks as well as informing them of the influence risk 
disclosure has on the value of the firm. These institutions are expected to guide firms toward the best 
practices of disclosures since firms look for such guidance by performing motivating role in this new era 
of information disclosure. It also calls on to managers who prefer to withhold from offering information to 
shareholder to be more transparent if they prefer to increase their banks market value and entice more 
investment. 
 
This study, like any other, suffers from a number of limitations. First, the sample of this study consisted 
only of listed Saudi banks. Thus, the results may not be valid for other sectors. Another potential limitation 
of investigation employing risk disclosure indexes to examine the levels of risk disclosure is that the 
outcomes are only valid to the extent that the risk disclosure index used is appropriate. Thirdly, annual 
reports have been used as the only source of data gathering, others such as interim reports,  the internet, 
banks web sites and press releases could be used in future studies. In spite of the noted limitations, it is 
hoped this study will inspire further investigations in this area of research. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Category and Type of Reported 
Risks 
References  
Accounting Policies  
Risk Management 
 
Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
Objective of Holding Derivatives/ 
instruments  
Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Use of Estimates   Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Hassan, 2009 
Collateral Assets against Loans  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009 
Financial Assets Impairment Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Hassan, 2009 
Other Assets Impairment Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; 
Hassan, 2009 
Contingent Liabilities Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009  
Contingent Assets Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009 
Detailed risk management  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007;  
Contingency  Abdullah et al., 2015; Hassan, 2009;  
Financial and other risks  
Pricing Risk ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015, Lipunga, 2014;  
Commodity risk  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Liquidity risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Alfredson et al., 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014; Hassan, 2009 
Credit risk  Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Capital Adequacy Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015  
Changes in Interest Rates Abdullah et al., 2015 
Credit Risk Exposure  Abdullah et al., 2015 
Operational Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Lipunga, 2014  
Insurance Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
ACCOUNTING & TAXATION ♦ Volume 8 ♦ Number 1 ♦ 2016 
 
19 
 
Market Risk Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004; Lipunga, 2014 
Interest Rate Lipunga, 2014; Abdullah et al., 2015; 
Currency risk Lipunga, 2014 
Exchange Rate Abdullah et al., 2015  
Sustainability Risk  
Sensitivity Analysis Abdullah et al., 2015; Ahmed et al., 2004  
Derivatives hedging and general 
risks information 
 
Cash flow Hedge Alfredson et al., 2007; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Equity Risk Abdullah et al., 2015 
Customer Satisfaction Abdullah et al., 2015 
Competition (Service Market)  Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000 
Natural Disasters ICAEW, 1997, 2000; Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014  
Communications Abdullah et al., 2015 
Outsourcing Abdullah et al., 2015 
Reputation Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Reputation risk  Abdullah et al., 2015; Lipunga, 2014 
Physical disasters (Explosions and 
Fire) 
Lipunga, 2014  
Changes in Technology Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Financial instruments  
Derivatives Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Cumulative Change in Fair value Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Reserves  
General Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Statutory Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Other Reserves Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015 
Segment information  
Geographical Concentration  Alfredson et al., 2007; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000;  
Customer Concentration  Hassan, 2009; Abdullah et al., 2015; ICAEW, 1997, 2000  
Business risk   
General Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009 
Regional Financial Problems  Hassan, 2009  
Political risk  Abdullah et al., 2015  
Diversification   
Performance  Abdullah et al., 2015;  
Compliance  with regulations 
  
 
Compliance with listing rules  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with financial regulations  Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with companies act 
requirements  
Lipunga, 2014 
Compliance with other regulations 
and laws  
Lipunga, 2014 
Litigation risk  Lipunga, 2014 
Health and Safety  Lipunga, 2014 
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